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THE SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

OF THE

GERMAN LUFTWAFFE

VOL. II

BIOGRAPHIES OF CONTRIBUTORS

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VOL. IIBIOGRAPHIES OF CONTRIBUTORSFOREWORD

Contained in this volume are the biographies of a number of former officers of the Luftwaffe Signal Intelligence Service, who contributed, in part, to the history of that service, which was compiled throughout the summer and autumn of 1945.

These biographies were requested, and are herein presented, for the following reasons:

- a. To reveal the type of individuals chosen for service in the Luftwaffe SIS.
- b. To throw certain sidelights upon operations of the Luftwaffe SIS.
- c. To set forth the attitude and reactions of Germans, somewhat above the average in both intelligence and ability, to the spirit and events of the times in which they lived and moved.

The biographies must be accepted and judged as presented. No attempt was made to influence the authors in any respect, and their contributions were voluntary. Translation of the German manuscripts was made by officers of the SIS, USAAF, who lived for a period of several months in close association with

TOP SECRET

the contributors, but who were charged with rendition of the texts into English with as close fidelity to the original German as possible. This accounts for the lack of polish in the product, as presented, compared to further studies of the history as a whole.

Finally, let it be stated that all of these biographies were written in German with the exception of that of Tech. Sergeant Gert Schlottmann, which was prepared in English, and was, in fact, the only contribution to the entire history presented in English manuscript.

J.G. SEABOURNE
Colonel, Air Corps,
SIS, USAAF.

TOP SECRET
VOL. II

LIST OF BIOGRAPHIES

<u>Contributor</u>		<u>Page</u>
Colonel Hans Eick,	C.O., SIS Regiment, East	1
Major Hans Windels,	C.O., II Battalion, SIS Regiment, East	7
Captain Wadim Herold,	C.O., III Battalion, SIS Regiment, East	14
Captain Wilhelm Kelch,	Radio Defense Corps, Wehrmacht	22
Captain Erich Hubner,	Chief of Referat, Chi-Stelle	30
Lieut. Waldemar Werther,	SIS Regiment, East	43
Lieut. Gerhard Chlubek,	SIS Regiment, East	49
Lieut. Gunter Lier,	SIS Regiment, South	55
Lieut. Werner Rasch,	SIS, Regiment, East	61
Lieut. Wilhelm P. von Lachum,	SIS, Regiment, East	65
Lieut. Helmut Mucke,	SIS Regiment, East	73
Lieut. Karl Majer,	SIS Regiment, South	76
Lieut. Martin Ludwig,	Referat B, Chi-Stelle	83
Tech. Sgt. Gert Schlottmann,	SIS Regiment, South	87

Paragraphs marked with an asterisk have been downgraded to "Secret" per 1st Ind ^{11/9/50} to the JCH. US RFS, filed in Safe #3 drawer #4.

TOP SECRETBiography of Colonel Hans Eick, Luftwaffe

12.8.1889	Born in Wesermünde, son of the director of North German Lloyd, Hugo Eick.
1894 - 1907	Classical high-school (Gymnasium) in Bremen.
1907 - 1908	Year of practical experience in machine construction and electrotechnics.
1908 - 1911	Studied in advanced technical schools.
1912	One year's service with Infantry.
1913 - 31.7.1914	Engineer with AEG in Rhineland.
1.8.1914 - 1920	Service in World War I; infantry, airplane pilot, prisoner of war in Russian hands, Freikorps.
1920 - 1934	Professional career as technical director with big electrotechnical corporations.
1.1.1935 - 1937	Officer (Captain) as operations officer for the Quartermaster General.
1.4.1938	Promotion to major.
Jan. 1938 - Aug. 1938	Commanding officer of an intercept station in Saxony (Russia, Czechoslovakia, Poland).
Sept. 1938 - Feb. 1939	Commanding officer of an intercept station in Breslau (Russia, Czechoslovakia, Poland).
March 1939 - Jan. 1940	Commanding Officer of an intercept station in Hungary (same as above, plus Balkans and Turkey).
Jan. 1940 - July 1940	Commanding officer of intercept station in Vienna (as above).
1.4.1941	Promoted to Lt. Colonel.
Aug. 1940 - Aug. 1942	Commanding Officer of Signal Intelligence Battalion in the East (Russia).
1.12.1942	Promoted to Colonel.
Sept. 1942 - Sept. 1944	Commanding Officer of SIB Regiment, West (England, USA, Mediterranean).
Oct. 1944 - April 1945	Commanding Officer of SIB Regt. 353, East, (Russia).

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Hans Gotthold Eick
Colonel and Regimental Commander

23 June 1945

Biography

H.G. Eick was born in Wesermünde on 12 August, 1889, the son of the director of North German Lloyd, Hugo Eick. While attending classical high-school in Bremen he made several voyages to Norway, England, France, Italy, and USA, accompanying his parents. In his home there were almost always visitors from the whole world over.

Thus he learned at an early age to appreciate foreign lands, and their customs and peoples. This background was broadened by trips taken during his years of study in advanced technical schools, after he had worked for two years acquiring practical experience in all branches of machine construction and electrotechnics.

He was particularly impressed by a trip to the USA in July and August 1909, during which he visited his relatives in Washington, D.C. He had become more mature in his 20 years than many older boys, and acquired a critical outlook toward everything he saw and heard. He established a lasting admiration for the living examples of the principles of achievement embodied in the phrase "selfmade man". He was equally impressed with the practical application of the phrase "time is money", and the salutary practice of recreation over the weekend after a week of steady work. He also had occasion to visit Fort Meyer, where the Wright brothers were making experimental flights. This led to the writers taking up flying in Germany, where he flew from 1913 to 1938.

He was astonished by the accentuated race segregation (coloured people only) and the family life of the average American - meals in a boarding house instead of at home and prepared by the wife.

As a member of the Washington, D.C., Y.M.C.A. he won the swimming championship of the USA, which brought him honorary membership in the "Y" and many invitations. He thus had opportunity to visit among others the general Director of the Westinghouse Co. In the anteroom of his office there hung the picture of a cowboy pointing his revolver at the spectator, and below the legend "Live always so, that you can look every man in the eye and tell him to go to the devil". This motto served him as a rod and staff for his whole life.

Upon completing his compulsory service with the Infantry (1911) he became acquisition and projection engineer for AEG in Duisburg, and after a half a year he was made head of a construction office in the Rhineland.

When war broke out in 1914 he had to join up immediately. As platoon and later company commander with the Infantry he served in the Argonne until January 1915, when he was wounded. After recovering he was transferred to the Flying Corps, and flew as pilot in the Southeast until the summer of 1916. Due to motor trouble he crashed, and together with his observer was taken prisoner in an unconscious condition. In an assembly camp he obtained some necessities of life from an American, member of the YMCA, and also got hold of an English-Russian dictionary and the loan of a considerable sum of money.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

The writer was all through European Russia, the Caucasus, and Siberia. Three vain attempts to escape interrupted his imprisonment, most of which was spent lying in chains in jails and houses of correction. In July 1918 he was transferred to the famous prison of the Tscheka, the "Lubjanka", in Moscow. For four weeks he saw uninterrupted death, by the firing squad, pass before his eyes. Under the protection of the Embassy he was released at the end of August 1918, but was not permitted to leave Moscow. When he was about to be arrested for a second time he got onto an invalid train, walking on crutches, and reached Berlin. He visited his parents in Wiesbaden, and three days after his arrival flew once more over London.

Upon the outbreak of the November Revolution in 1918 he was on temporary duty in Gotha. With the permission of the officers, and at the request of the soldiers, he took the post of president of the "Soldier's and Worker's Council" until January 1919; during this period there were no disturbances of any kind in Gotha.

The author had lived through and seen enough of Bolshevism to appreciate the frightful danger that lay in the materialization and exploitation of the communist idea into a practical reality. He acted on these conclusions he had drawn, and fought on until the last minute in the Baltic, in that heroic struggle for the preservation of Human Culture, a struggle which as it turned out was betrayed by the whole world.

Returning to Germany at the end of 1919 he found disunity, fraud, and lack of character widespread, which were beginning their gravedigger's dance for the German nation. Inflation, ruin, unemployment and looting by the victorious powers made the whole population, including politicians and crooks, sink to ever lower levels. The Poles and Czechs celebrated cruel orgies in the territories taken from them by the Germans, and the French occupation troops did the same in the West. The occupation of the Rhineland completed the gigantic injustice which was done to the German people. The greater the want, the greater the discontent with everything, which aroused against those responsible a hatred hitherto unknown to the German people.

After several offers of jobs were disapproved by the demobilization commissioner (the rule stated that one had to have been a native of the town in question when the war broke out), he took a position in January 1920 as engineer with Brown, Boveri & Co. A.G. in their offices in Leipzig. There he married his boyhood sweetheart. In 1923 a daughter was born and in 1925 a son.

In 1921 he became chief of the Kassel branch, and in 1922 he moved to Berlin, where he held the post of director of a melting and foundry works. This inflationary undertaking fell through towards the end of 1923 and he returned to B.B. & Co. in Leipzig.

In 1929 he was engaged by a large electrical enterprise where he remained as technical director until the end of 1934, after which he returned to the Luftwaffe as an officer, as will be described subsequently. The conceptions "Time is money" and the "Self-made man" had made him a hard worker. He sought recreation in sport and music. As a budding patriot he occupied himself with Politics (Stressmann), but the rotteness of inside political life compelled him to withdraw completely. He maintained a large circle of friends in America and Europe, by personal contact and correspondence. Mutual respect was the

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

basis of these friendships.

When the National Socialist idea made its appearance, he embraced it eagerly. In many respects he was in complete agreement with its platform, as it was for supplanting antiquated and ineffectual forms with new and better ones, (abandonment of class distinction, the merit system, personal as against anonymous responsibility, maintenance of personal honor, social conditions improved, etc.). But closer acquaintance showed him that here, as in all revolutions of the world, there were only very few clean and honest people, and a great many types with every vice from petty thievery to crime, did all they could to get on the bandwagon. He saw ahead what had to come - namely, that as had been true in Russia, a doctrine good in itself was in the execution transformed into the very opposite of what its creator had in mind. An attempt to fight individually against this tendency always became entangled in the barbed wire of vanity, self seeking, and ambition of the human equation, and was stopped by the lack of any ideas which would provide better alternatives. Thus the author, despite great sympathy for the National Socialist idea, held himself aloof from all internal politics. As member of the Aero Club and of the German Sportsman Pilot Society (later the NSFK) he worked off his feelings in the air, the only element in those times which was still clean.

He made many friends and acquaintances while flying. At one of the annual reunions of the "Alten Adler" (World War I pilot veterans) at the end of 1934, he allowed himself to be persuaded to go back to the Luftwaffe as an officer. As an enthusiastic veteran pilot, he imagined he would be in his element, that is, that he would thus become once more a professional aviator. But instead of this he was assigned to the Air Ministry, to the office of the Generalquartiermeister where he worked on the specifications and procurement of many different pieces of equipment necessary to the building up of the Luftwaffe.

From 1935 to 1937 he spent most of his time behind a desk (the pace: if 24 hours aren't enough, then work at night). He got less and less opportunity to fly. The Deutschlandfluge of 1937 and 1938 were the last regular flights he made. In 1935 the author began to learn Russian, as the language interested him because of its difficulty and because it represented the manner of thinking of a completely different world, that of the Slavs. He passed the interpreter's examination in 1937.

In the beginning of 1938 General Martini, Chief Signal Communications Officer of the Luftwaffe, had the author brought to his attention, and drafted him for the Signal Intelligence Service (H-Dienst). Upon being given command of an SIS-station in Saxony (Pulsnitz) he jumped right into the practical work. It was difficult, but he started from the beginning and learned the business. In September he took over the activating and command of a new SIS-station in Breslau, from which Russia, Czechoslovakia and Poland were covered.

In March 1939 he was given a special mission to set up and command an SIS-organization in Hungary. During his one-year stay in Budapest the whole of the Balkans and Turkey were assigned for coverage, and as there were no data already on hand concerning the radio traffic of these countries, it was necessary to take the first steps in the dark.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

In January 1940 he was appointed commanding officer of the new SIS-battalion in Vienna, but in August 1940 he had to take over the SIS-battalion in Bernau near Berlin, as it had fallen way behind in its performance. This incapable outfit was soon reshaped into an exemplary battalion. The author took it with him in the war against Russia. Up until he was called back to the West (August 1942) he had a chance to see the length and breadth of the occupied territory from Kiev to North Cape, and he took in everything he saw and heard. His command of the language made it easy for him to come into close contact with all strata of civilians and prisoners of war. All captured Russian aviators were interrogated by him. The picture that his mind pieced together was a deeply moving one. He discussed it frequently with people in responsible positions. The traditional German inability to incorporate the right psychology in their policy of dealing with other peoples was again demonstrated in the fatally idiotic manner in which Russian PW's and civilians were treated. Both were handled as inferior people by "Supersmen". The prisoners of war died of exhaustion, as nobody took enough trouble about them and they were down to almost their last reserves of strength when they were captured. In this way they lost whatever resistance they might have had in the periods of often unavoidable food shortage, and died like flies. Many thousand however could escape back to their own lines through the many gaps at the front, and could tell the folks at home what they had been through. And this strengthened very considerably the fighting spirit of the Russian people, and consequently also the power of the Soviet Union.

The population at the beginning of the campaign had welcomed the Germans as liberators from a frightful yoke. But right behind the fighting soldier came the civil administration appointed by the Party, which amounted to nothing else than another Tscheka, in that it ruthlessly took all provisions from the people, and gorged while they starved. So the hatred for the German invader grew more and more. The war became a national cause for the people. And in this manner did the Germans themselves forge for the Bolsheviks the weapon that was to bring about the victory of the Soviet and the downfall of Germany. Several memoranda in which the author pointed this out remained unanswered and unacted upon.

In August 1942 by way of experiment the first SIS regiment in the German Armed Forces was ordered activated. The author was entrusted with this task. Until September 1944 he was the commander of the SIS Regiment West. At the end the regiment was about 5000 strong, and included 500 women auxiliaries. It was spread out in about 200 different operational sites, ranging from the tip of Denmark, over all North Germany, Holland, Belgium, France, down to Italy. After the regiment had to retreat from Chateau Salins to Limburg/Lahn in September 1944, due to the Allied advances, the author was charged with combining all the battalions on the Eastern Front into one regiment, which he commanded. He was glad of this assignment, as he was now right in the fight against the most dangerous enemy of all, Soviet Russia. Until January 1945 he had his headquarters in Cottbus, southeast of Berlin, from there on until April 13, 1945, in Dresden-Klotzsche, Saxony. Because of the total destruction of Dresden by air attacks (in 1 1/2 hours approximately 300,000 persons were killed) and because of the situation on the Fronts he moved his troops south towards Passau about the middle of April. In the first days of May he moved to the Austrian Alps at Wagrein near Radstadt. The high command of the Luftwaffe put him in command of all SIS regiments and battalions, that is, over the whole SIS of the Luftwaffe.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

After the Armistice, with permission of American Military Government, he moved with the 2nd Battalion of Regiment 353 by way of Zell am See to the area west of the Chiem See, in southern Bavaria. This move was made without any convoy guard or Allied supervision of any kind. From there he went on to the Luftwaffe Collecting Camp at Aschbach between Bad Aibling and Holzkirchen, some thirty miles South of Munich, as he was running out of provisions, and, in order to obtain discharge for his men, had to make some sort of liaison with a United States Commission. On Sunday, the 17th of June, 1945 he was interrogated by SIS officers of the USAAF and ordered away. So he had to take leave of his troops. All 600 men with which he had set out in the unit vehicles at the capitulation were present and accounted for in flawless discipline: no man was sick, none had to be punished, there were no deserters, and all had enough to eat. This conclusion to a difficult time serves him as a bright memory and an obligation for the future.

TOP SECRET

Hans Windels
Major of the Reserve and C.O. of
the II Bn. Air Signal Rgt. 353.

TOP SECRET

Curriculum Vitae

I. Personal Data

Born 7th May 1896 in Celle near Hannover.

Father: Hermann Windels, teacher.

Mother: Frida, née Sievers.

Married Henry Windels, née Roeben in 1919.

Two daughters ages 8 and 19.

II. Schooling and professional education

1902 - 1910 Realschule in Celle.

1911 - 1912 Realschule in Bremen, final state examination "Matura".

1912 - 1914 Merchant's school in Bremen, merchant's course, photographic
dealing and export.

III. Professional Career

1919 Took over a business dealing in photographic materials and drugs
in Varel in Oldenburg.

1923 Founded the firm Hans Windels in Bremen, whole-sale business in
radio and electrical appliances.

1940 Closed the firm, due to being called for military duty.

1944 Destruction of the business building in Bremen by air attack.

IV. Military Career

1914 Sept. Entered as volunteer in the Telegraph Bn. (Signal Bn.) Nr. 5
in Clausdorf near Berlin. During the war active as telephonist
and radio man in France, Russia, and Turkey.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

- 1919 Discharged as Lieutenant of the Reserve.
- 1936 Called up for the first 8 weeks military training in the new Wehrmacht.
- 1937 Until start of the war engaged in several weeks manoeuver each year and was promoted to 1st Lt. of the Reserve, then Captain of the Reserve.
- 26.8.1939 Called up during mobilization and sent to Quernum near Brunswick. Activated the 9th Air Signal Radio Intercept Co. (motorized)/Air Signal Rgt. 2. C.O. of this Co. until May 1942. Operated against England from sites in Schleswig-Holstein, Norway, Sicily, Greece, Crete.
- 1942 June Appointed C.O. of the Signal Air Radio Intercept Battalion East.
- 1942 July Promoted to Major of the Reserve.
- 5.7.1945 Discharged.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Hans Windels
 Major, Commanding II Battalion (Radio Intelligence)
 Luftwaffe, Signal Regiment 353

21 June, 1945

Biography

I was born in Celle near Hannover on May 7, 1896. My father was a teacher and both my parents died when I was ten years old. After completing my scholastic examinations I went to Bremen for training in a commercial profession. Shortly before the completion of my training World War I broke out. I was accepted as a volunteer in the Army Signal Corps and served with field units in Russia and France. At the time of the 1918 Armistice I was in Palestine where I was employed as a radio operator. In Russia I participated in the first experiments in telegraphic intelligence, and in Turkey I was employed for a time as a radio intercept operator. While telegraphic intelligence brought very good results at the time in Russia, no note-worthy successes were obtained from radio intelligence in Turkey against England. Following internment in Constantinople, I was discharged early in 1919 as a reserve lieutenant. I married shortly thereafter and in 1923 founded the firm of Hans Windels in Bremen, wholesaler of radio and electric supplies. The business enjoyed a period of very successful years and I profited accordingly. 1931 brought me a combination business and educational trip to the USA; I have also travelled at various times to England, France and Hungary. In those days I did not participate in politics. After World War I I joined the "Stahlhelm", an organization of World War Veterans, which in 1935 was preemptorily incorporated in the "NSDAF".

I have never worked for the Party or their organization; I could not reconcile myself to the fact that so many types of weak characters and ne'er-do-wells were vigorously sought after by the Party. Within my economic group I was chief for North Germany. From 1933 business obtained favorable marketing conditions within Germany. Unhealthy competition was eliminated and business was guided on a calm, steady course. The export trade however, associated with Jewish political control, passed entirely into the background. From 1936, as a former World War officer, I was called up annually by the new Wehrmacht for manoeuvres with the Signal troops of the Luftwaffe.

During these exercises for the most part I conducted courses in radio training or commanded radio companies. During my last manoeuvres in June 1939 I served as commander of a radio intelligence company (my intended duty in case of war) with the "22nd Weather Receiving Station" in Husum. This was the code-name for a Luftwaffe intercept station which monitored the radio traffic of the RAF in England. The results from this station in peacetime were already very good. Organization, strength and armament of the RAF, likewise the number and service ability of airfields, were all

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

very well known. Voluminous British radio traffic was heard and when, at the outbreak of war, it suddenly became enciphered, we met with no difficulties in reading this traffic because of the background we had built up during the previously mentioned period.

* At the outbreak of the war on August 26th, 1939, I was called up as a reserve Captain and was authorized to form a Radio Intelligence Company in Querum near Brunswick. The company had two platoons, the first consisting of a mixture of regulars and reservists, and the second being the "22nd Weather Receiving Station", the established intercept station in Husum. At that time the company worked with considerable success for Fliegerkorps X in Hamburg. When the Fliegerkorps was transferred to Norway in May 1940, I also moved with the company to the Stavanger area and from there listened to the radio communications of the RAF, also monitored by Husum and several D/F stations set up in East Frisia, Denmark and Norway. Success was considerable and the work easy, since there were only a few fixed frequencies to be monitored. From the air-to-ground traffic of bombers and fighters we were able to give to our headquarters important indications of impending attack, and information concerning the position of convoys which came out of Pantland Firth. At that time it was noticed by my company that the naval radio beacons on the English and Scottish coasts came on the air with their peace-time recognition signal and under certain circumstances this coincided with the appearance of a convoy. In reviewing all signal intelligence it can be said that the losses suffered by British shipping at that time, at the hands of our Luftwaffe, were unquestionably attributable to the incautious handling of radio communications.

If at first our headquarters had felt any scepticism as to the reliability of our reports, for example those relative to the position of convoys, and had decided our reports must be confirmed by a reconnaissance aircraft, it would without doubt very soon have served only to make more difficult the source of our intercept reports; for it had been proved that the appearance of a German reconnaissance aircraft in the vicinity of a convoy would naturally occasion a higher degree of preparedness and the taking of certain defensive measures on the part of the enemy. By listening to "SOS" reports from ships which had been attacked we were very often able to confirm, for our bomber crews, whether these ships had been sunk or to ascertain the degree of damage.

* In Norway, in the summer of 1940, my company conducted the first experiments in the use of English-speaking intercept operators on reconnaissance flights. Although losses occurred, this development proved itself to the point where no reconnaissance pilot started a mission without an airborne interceptor. Those intercept operators detailed to flying monitored continuously the R/T traffic from British fighters and evaluated it. When flying missions, therefore, they were familiar with the individual fighter control sectors and encoded grid positions of the British fighters, and from the basis of R/T interceptions could warn our pilots of impending attack and give them directions for changing course to avoid interception.

In December 1940 the company moved with Fliegerkorps X to Taormina in Sicily, thus becoming the first radio intelligence company in the Mediterranean area. We were the first German organization to enter Italy as a

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

unit, and I will briefly describe the impressions that I received there.

During the journey through the Southern Tyrol we were warned against our Italian allies by Germans living there (later such discussions were forbidden); these Germans informed us that the inhabitants of this former German region were being severely oppressed by the Italians, and that they hated the Italians. On the journey through Italy we were greeted at the larger railroad stations by delegations of the Fascist Party, and were showered with gushing verbiage. The populace itself stared at us mostly without enthusiasm, and one felt that we were not very welcome.

As station commander in Taormina I had frequent contact with the Italian authorities, both the military and the Fascist Party. I was greatly surprised by the gulf existing between the Italian armed forces and the Party; while the Party took pains in our behalf and sought to be helpful in all matters, the military often placed serious obstacles in our path which bordered on sabotage. Cooperation with the navy was good. From the time of my arrival in Italy I had the uncomfortable feeling that Italy would one day drop out of the war, and for this reason I was very circumspect in passing on signal intelligence information to our allies. To what extent my superior headquarters was of the same opinion I do not know. Future events proved me correct, and I am convinced that at time the British had been advised by the Italians of our signal intelligence service. At the end of April, 1941, our work was unexpectedly made much more difficult by major changes in the British radio and enciphering procedures, and it was more than a week until we got back on the track. I had to realize, upon my arrival in Italy, that on the whole the war was not taken seriously by the Italians, everything could be purchased, industry functioned as in peace-time, and one could see none of the conservation and application necessary for war. To be sure on every wall and other available place was displayed a large-size slogan such as "less talk - more work". However, youths by the hundreds around the market-places of Sicilian cities and in the streets of Catania and Palermo from morning until evening, smoking and chattering. I often said, at that time, that I felt sorry for Mussolini because he had to lead such a people.

The Italian army, according to our military conception, was all more or less "opera buffa". One could experience the most unbelievable things. Occasionally of course, one met qualified officers, mostly North-Italians, who had the best intentions but who also could not carry through for themselves and poured out their troubles to us.

Only the Italian Navy had an "Intercept Service". The Italians were good radio operators, but with the poor equipment of their Signal Intelligence Service, and an insufficient number of direction-finders and receivers, coupled with their slight understanding of evaluation and deciphering, they were able to produce only paltry results, and were always very eager to receive intelligence from me.

Based on our experiences in Norway, gathering intelligence on the English Motherland, it was an easy task for us, in our new mission in the Mediterranean area, to break into the local radio traffic, and very soon

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

we were able to furnish our headquarters with an accurate background of the deployment, strength, and armament of the RAF in the Middle East. We gave valuable aid to our fighter-pilots in the battle against Malta on the basis of intercepted British fighter R/T, and many claims of aircraft destroyed could be and were substantiated by my company. At that time R/T monitoring was being done by small out-stations located in the immediate vicinity of the fighter Geschwader on the southern coast of Sicily.

In June 1941 the company moved with Fliegerkorps X to Athens, at the same time I organized an intercept platoon out of company personnel for the mission in Africa. I placed this "SI-platoon Africa" in Derna where it worked for the Flieger-Fuehrer Africa. (In Athens, our signal intelligence also continued to enjoy very good results against the RAF Middle East. In particular, all reconnaissance flights, on the basis of our experiences in Norway, were carried out with the use of English-speaking intercept operators of my company. There were many letters of commendation from reconnaissance units stating that the arduous reconnaissance of the strongly protected harbor of Alexandria and of the Suez Canal could only have been possible with the help of the airborne intercept operators. On one occasion an intercept operator (Sergeant Hartmann) was mentioned, together with the crew of a reconnaissance aircraft, in the communiqué of the High Command in recognition of his services. (I still remember the following incident from those days: a British fighter control station near Alexandria was trying again and again to vector its fighters onto a German reconnaissance aircraft containing one of my airborne interceptors. Each time the British fighters received their instructions and flew toward the target the reconnaissance aircraft changed course and they could not find him. Afterwards the British R/T operator at the fighter control stations was heard to say several times: "I think that German is drunk", and gave up his efforts, while our reconnaissance ship succeeded in obtaining coverage of the harbor.)

In the fall of 1941, as one of the first officers of the SIS I received the War Service Cross, I Class. At that time we were able to give our headquarters important data concerning the order of battle of the RAF in the African sector, and concerning the organization of important supply bases in the Nile region and on the shores of the Red Sea.

Meanwhile the scope of the company had widened to the point where the resources on hand were not sufficient to handle everything. For this reason another SI-unit under Captain Feichtner moved to Athens, and the company gave up part of its sphere. To the company exclusively remained the task of intercepting air-to-ground W/T and R/T traffic, and Feichtner's unit took over all point-to-point traffic. This unit likewise functioned very successfully.

In April 1942 the company moved with the Fliegerkorps to Crete and here continued its work with very good results.

In June 1942 I was appointed commanding officer of the newly formed "Radio Intercept Battalion East", transferred to Saolenzak, and promoted to Major. I commanded this battalion (it was later redesignated as the

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

II Battalion ((Radio Intelligence)) of Luftwaffe SIS Regiment 353) with its six companies until the end of the war. Its mission, etc. had been the subject of special reports. In the autumn of 1944 I was the first, and until the present time the only officer of the SIS to receive the high distinction of the "German Cross" in silver, and on Christmas 1944, as special recognition for "outstanding efficiency" I received a personally dedicated photograph of Field Marshall Ritter von Greim, Commander-in-Chief of Luftflotte 6 and later successor to Goering.

In the summer of 1944 my business establishment in Bremen, including the warehouse and its contents, was completely destroyed by a British air attack. The business had been closed since 1941. Of the fate of my wife and two children I have heard nothing since March of this year. My home, which lies in the Southern extremity of Bremen where fierce fighting took place had probably also been destroyed. To what extent my resources in Bremen, such as my bank account and personal effects, still exist I do not know, and I have the understandable wish to adjust these matters soon and to protect my family from want. After settling these matters I am at your disposition, in so far as value is attached to my cooperation, since I am convinced, and it is also the opinion of my superior headquarters, that in handling over my knowledge and experiences I can no longer in any way injure Germany, and perhaps may serve her.

I am of the conviction that Europe faces the peril of Bolshevism. In the Russian-occupied section of Germany the Communist Party is not only tolerated but its cause will be vigorously advanced, and owing to the distress and confusion prevailing everywhere, will be greatly sought after. In the American and British-occupied zones the outlook is no different. A great many Germans, through the loss of their personal and real estate, have become real proletarians who have nothing more to lose, and who under Bolshevism can only gain. This point of view is strongly upheld by soldiers in concentration camps, and there it is debated whether one should learn Russian or English. Many times the opinion is expressed that America, should there be a forceful push toward the west by the Russians, would withdraw from the continent without giving battle, and that the Bolsheviks would be received with open arms in France and Spain. Only one who has lived for years in Russia can estimate what is in prospect for the intellect and culture of Europe. I do not consider this danger immediately acute. Even through the Russians obviously held back much of their air forces during the last offensive (according to signal intelligence), still they must restore their battered ground forces, and it is only to be hoped, that the USA and England will defeat Japan quickly in order that they may have their hands free for European affairs.

TOP SECRET

Captain Wadim Herold **TOP SECRET**
 Battalion Commander, 353rd Signal
 Intelligence Regiment (East) German Luftwaffe

6 July, 1945.

Curriculum Vitae

I. Personal Data

14.10.1916	Born in Mesched (Iran). Father: Alexander Herold, occupation: merchant, Mother: Olga née Saposchnikova.
6.3.1918	Death of father
April 1921	Moved to Germany
September 1926	Mother married to Konstantin Wieber, merchant
September 1927	Parents emigrate to South America (Paraguay)
31.10.1942	Own marriage

II. Education

1924 - 1927	Elementary school in Berlin
April 1927 - March 1936	Reform-Realgymnasium in Naumburg an der Saale.

III. Military Career

April 1936 - Sept. 1936	Completion of service in the Reich Labor Service
12.10.1936	Entry as volunteer into the 5./Air Signal Bn. 11 in Ballieth near Königsberg

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

1.4.1937	Accepted as officer candidate and transferred to school- and experiment Bn. in Halle an der Saale. Start of training as radio interceptor.
1.9.1937 - 1.2.1938	Aviation radio operator - and observation course.
1.2.1938 - 1.7.1938	War College in Wildpark Werder near Berlin
July 1938	Familiarization course at the W-station Pulsnitz
1.8.1938	Transfer to Air Signal Bn. Ob.d.L.
1.9.1938	Promotion to Lieutenant
12.10.1938 - 1.2.1939	Radio intercept work in Hungary
1.2.1939	Transfer to school- and experimental Rgt. in Köthen as platoon leader of the radio intercept and D/F platoon.
26.8.1939 - 4.10.1939	In charge of an SI-section in Slovakia and Poland
4.10.1939 - 31.12.1939	Platoon leader of the SI-platoon s.b.V.1 of Air Signal Rgt. Ob.d.L.
1.1.1940 - 1.2.1941	Kommando (Temporary duty) to Chi-Stelle OKW
1.1.1940 - 31.12.1940	In charge of an SI-team in Varna (Bulgaria)
1.9.1940	Promotion to 1st Lieutenant
1.2.1941 - 26.11.1943	As C.o. of 9./Air Signal Radio Intercept Co. (not) Air Signal Rgt. 4, coverage of Soviet Russia
1.4.1943	Promotion to Captain
26.11.1943 - cessation of hostilities	As Bn. C.O. of the Air Signal Radio Intercept Bn. (not.) III/4, coverage of Sov.Rus.

Wadim Herold
Captain, German Luftwaffe

TOP SECRET

Biography

My name is Wadim Herold. I was born on October 14, 1916 in Mesched (Persia). My father, Alexander Herold, a merchant, moved from Moscow to Mesched. In 1914 he married my mother, Olga (maiden name Saposchnikova), who had been staying with her brother, a Russian cavalry officer stationed at Mesched. My father died in 1918. In 1919 my mother decided to go to France with my brother and myself. We remained in Paris one year and in 1921 we moved to Germany to be with my father's relatives.

In Berlin I attended grammar school. In 1925 my mother married a merchant, Konstantin Wieber. In 1927 my parents emigrated to Paraguay. At present my parents are in Argentina and I have had no news of them for three years. My brother and I stayed on in school in Germany. We progressed to the formerly State-supported educational institution of Namburg on Saale, a "Reform-realgymnasium" with boarding facilities. There I spent my whole school career. After the Nazi party came to power the school was turned into a national socialist institution. No considerable changes took place in the curriculum. Together with ordinary sports, there was an increased emphasis on military sport. History became the most important subject. The many false impressions, that in such schools as this politics was inculcated into the students, are not borne out by the facts. Neither is the other idea substantiated, that political leadership material was turned out by such places. The curriculum and boarding-school life was exactly the same as in any other.

After the final examinations I was free to make any choice of professions. Likewise at that time the scholars did not belong to the Hitler Youth. In April 1936 I passed my "Abitur" examination. I was then called into the German Labor Service for my six months' tour of duty, which I served in a camp near Beuthen in Upper Silesia. While in the Labor Service I volunteered for the Wehrmacht as it was my intention to take up the study of medicine after completing my period of military service. My brother, a lieutenant in a bomber Geschwader, was killed in an aircraft crash in 1937. In October 1942 I married my wife Hannelore, nee Jacobsen, who lives with her parents in Brauburg (Anhalt). Since April 1945 I have had no news of her.

Military Record and War-Time Mission

I was taken into the Luftwaffe Signal Corps in October 1936 and assigned to the 5th company of the 11th Luftwaffe Signal Battalion at Ballieth, near Königsberg (East Prussia). During recruit training several soldiers, of which I was one, were selected for a training course, the purpose of which was to examine their qualifications for becoming officers. After passing the training course I pledged myself to active duty as a Luftwaffe officer. The reason for this was my interest in serving as a technician, the

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

opportunity for which was offered by the Luftwaffe, and to participate in the task of building up the German Wehrmacht. Political motives played no part in my decision. In April 1937 I came to the Luftwaffe School and Experimental Battalion (2nd Company) in Halle-on-the-Saale. Here my career in the Signal Intelligence Service began. At this time the School and Experimental Battalion began setting up the first intercept platoons (mobile) within the Luftwaffe. By 1936 the SIS of the Luftwaffe had already set up fixed stations manned for the most part by civilian personnel. In Halle began the militarization of the SIS in order to provide for the possibility of its use in the field. I was assigned to one of these intercept platoons, and in June 1937 I took part, as an intercept operator, in a communications command post exercise in Westphalia, this being the first time that an intercept platoon ever participated in such exercises. Naturally the experiment proved unsuccessful. Practice and experience were both lacking. The exercise again demonstrated that only the best radio personnel with a thorough mastery of German traffic should be considered for the SIS. Moreover, it was seen that the intercept operators had to receive their introduction to foreign radio traffic at the fixed intercept stations of the Luftwaffe. In October I was detailed to an airborne radio operator's training course, including instruction as an observer. I attended the officer candidate schools in Wildpark and Werder near Berlin. After completing this course we came as officer candidates to the Luftwaffe Signal School in Halle, there, after an examination, to be prepared for our eventual assignment. I and three other comrades were assigned to the SIS. We were immediately sent to a SI-Station at Pulsnitz (near Dresden) for further instruction. This station, at that time, was monitoring Czechoslovakia, Russia, and Rumania. Our mission was to familiarize ourselves with this area. In 1938 I was transferred to the Luftwaffe Headquarters Signal Battalion in Potsdam-Biche. From here I was sent on my first assignment, operation "Stephan" in Hungary. I commanded the unit in Nyriegyhaza. The main station was located in Budapest. D/F stations were placed in Budapest, Szeged, Papa, Nyriegyhaza, and later in Beregszas. Traffic was intercepted from Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, Jugoslavia, Rumania, and later on also Turkey. On September 1st, 1938 I was promoted to Lieutenant. In February 1939, at the instigation of "W-10" (Chd-Stelle), I was recalled to the Signal Battalion of Luftwaffe Headquarters and there learned of my transfer to the 2nd company of the School and Experimental Regiment as commander of an intercept and D/F platoon. The school and experimental Battalion had in the meantime become a regiment and had moved to the Kothen air base. Up until the beginning of the war I was able to devote myself entirely to the training of this platoon. In addition to giving all the radio operators frequent practice, from time to time I detached them to "W" stations and "Wo" stations in order that they might gain an insight into the radio communications of foreign countries. Later, interception of Soviet Union traffic was undertaken by the platoon itself. When war came the platoon proved its worth as a Fliegerkorps Company in the Western, Eastern, and Balkan campaigns.

In July I was ordered to "W-10" in Berlin for a conference. I was to take a unit into Estonia to monitor the Soviet Union. Equipment and radio sets had already been sent ahead and the unit was in Berlin ready to depart when the undertaking was called off because the Foreign Office had received intelligence that the occupation of the Baltic countries by the Soviet

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Union was imminent. I received an order to hold myself and my unit in readiness for another mission in Köthen. On the 24th of August I received my instructions, and on the 26th moved with my company into Slovakia. We carried out our mission jointly in Zipser-Neudorf with an Army intercept station. Poland and the Soviet Union were monitored. Poland had been neglected by the SIS. Essentially only the contents of plain-text messages were evaluated. After the war broke out we moved to Humane (East Slovakia), and later to Cracow. After the end of the Polish campaign the unit went to the Luftwaffe Headquarters Signal Regiment at Potsdam-Eiche, since the intercept platoon of the School and Experimental Regiment had meanwhile been transferred there. The third battalion of the Luftwaffe Headquarters Signal Regiment was the radio intercept battalion, whose commander was also chief of "W-10" (Chi-Stelle). This battalion had meanwhile moved into the Marstall (Air Ministry). At this time I stayed at the Marstall a great deal. My special interest lay in the sphere of my knowledge of the language in that section of Russia being monitored. (It was especially interesting at that time to follow the course of the Russo-Finnish war; this was made possible by thorough radio intelligence cover. Much intelligence was gained during that period which was to be of great importance for the future.) At this time discussions were also going on concerning the establishment of an SI-Station on Rhodes, and it was intended that I be the commander of this station. The plan ran amok because the Italians wanted to set up this station, using our equipment and their own personnel. Also at this time preparations were being made for the use of two SI-aircraft (Ju 86 R's, suitable for high altitudes). These aircraft were later put to use, but without success. In December my platoon became a company, but I had to give up my command since my transfer to the Wehrmacht Chi-Stelle (OKW) was imminent. On the first of January, 1940, I reported to my new station and on January 7th arrived in Bulgaria with a Luftwaffe unit. Three SI-Stations had been set up there, two in Sofia and Burgas by the Army, one in Varna by the Luftwaffe. The region which I was to monitor comprised Greece, Turkey, Syria, and the Mediterranean area. Syria was thoroughly covered. From an evaluation standpoint the other regions were only superficially treated, since sufficient personnel was not available. The traffic went to the Chi-Stelle of the Wehrmacht (OKW) in Berlin to be worked on further. Results were good.

On January 9, 1940 I became a first lieutenant. At this time the Luftwaffe was contemplating an intensified coverage for the SIS in the Balkans. Accordingly, an SI-Station was set up in Constanza as an out-station of "Special Duty "W"-Station". An additional company was provided for the Bulgaria area. On December 31, 1940, I received an order to augment the SI-Station in Constanza by the addition of my unit. On February 1, 1941 I became company commander of the 9th Company of the 4th Luftwaffe Signal Regiment, a part of which was already working in Sofia. In March the rest of the company was summoned from Vienna. The area to be monitored was essentially the same as that covered by the unit in Varna. In addition the cover of Jugoslavia was increased. All deciphering and evaluation was done by the company. My company succeeded in breaking the Greek Air Force code. Part of the company participated in the Grecian campaign but was soon withdrawn. How important the SIS had been in the Balkan war, particularly during the Jugoslav campaign, I learned in a talk with the Luftwaffe attaché in Sofia who had just returned from an attachés' conference in Berlin. At this conference

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

the Reichsmarshal expressed the opinion that the smoothness of German operations in the Balkan campaigns was due to signal intelligence.

In May 1940 I received an order to put the company on Russian cover. Part of my former cover was taken over by W-34, and part by the 3rd Battalion of the 4th Luftwaffe Signal Regiment which had moved from Hirschstatten, near Vienna, to Athens. I had to give up experienced personnel to them. In the beginning of July the company moved to Ramnicul Sarat (Rumania) in the Fliegerkorps IV area. There I began the Russian campaign, in which I was engaged until the end. The organization and employment of radio intelligence in the southern sector of the Eastern front has been dealt with in a special report. After the outbreak of hostilities the Company moved with Fliegerkorps IV to Nikolayev. The Fliegerkorps was continuously provided by the company with enemy messages for evaluation by the intelligence section. In Nikolayev the Company had to rejoin the 3rd Battalion of LNR 4. A newly activated company was also assigned to the Fliegerkorps. At this time I personally had to travel about a great deal and carried out reconnaissance for sites and then set up D/F's and out-stations. (Early in 1942 I took command of an R/T detachment for the Sebastopol and Kerch Peninsula offensives. At that time fighter R/T was only very spasmodic and for the most part R/T messages of army units were intercepted, the evaluated results often furnishing lucrative targets for our ground attack and bomber units.)

At the end of July the battalion moved to Mariopol. On the 9th August I joined a unit which was advancing into the Caucasus. At the end of September the battalion moved to a new operational site at Kisslawodsk. An R/T detachment which had been placed in Terek did not bring the desired results, since fighter R/T was still very rare. On the 7th of January, 1943, the battalion began its retreat from the Caucasus region. The retreat followed a path through Rostov to Mariopol. I here received an order to proceed to the Crimea with a special unit to comply with a request from Fliegerkorps I for its own radio intelligence. The unit remained in Eupatoria until November, and then was withdrawn from the Crimean fortress. In addition to the other successes of the unit it was interesting to note that during the entire battle of the Kuban bridgehead the targets of the enemy's air force could be predicted most accurately, and timely warning given to our troops. Messages from the air liaison officers with the armies could be daily intercepted and deciphered. These messages revealed impending attacks with exact particulars as to the units to participate. The R/T units also proved themselves in the Crimea. In May heavy fighter R/T traffic was intercepted on the Kuban bridgehead. An R/T detachment located there worked in cooperation with our own fighter units with good results. Later, when supply difficulties in fuel and aircraft were encountered, sorties were only flown on the basis of SIS reports. In this way contact with the enemy and destruction of his aircraft were most likely to be achieved. An R/T unit later placed on the Perekop front was equally successful. On March 1st, 1943, I became a captain. The mission in the Crimea had been a very rich experience for me and I again had time to work on evaluation and deciphering. Meanwhile the battalion had moved from Mariopol to Nikolayev, by way of Krivd-Rog and Kamenka, near Dnepropetrovsk and after my return from the Crimea I was given command of the battalion. Owing to further German withdrawals on the Eastern Front the battalion moved to Odessa, and later to Bacau (Rumania).

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

In April, in the interest of better signal communications, there followed a move to Debreczen (Hungary). In Debreczen an alliance was made with the Hungarian SIS and cooperation effected. One company of the existing Hungarian SI-Battalion, which had been designed for intercepting air force traffic, was incorporated within the framework of my battalion. The company had its own evaluation and deciphering sections which, with our assistance, worked independently. In giving information to them, especially in the case of codes, restraint was exercised. The company remained with the battalion until the end. In addition to the fine cooperation, the company commander and I were united in a firm friendship. A new monitoring commitment was added, that of the U.S. Air Force in Russia. This task was made easier by the Soviet flak and aircraft reporting traffic which revealed, a day in advance, comparatively exact details of intended flights.

In August the collapse of Rumania took by surprise two companies and several out-stations of mine, located in the Rumanian area. Our personnel and equipment were lost. How it could have come as a surprise to the Headquarters was incomprehensible to me. At the time of my frequent sojourns in Rumania it was known by every civilian and every German soldier that it must come soon. Even the exact date was named by the civilian population. The political leaders must have been struck blind.

In June I was named battalion commander. At the end of September the battalion moved to Horn near Vienna. My battalion now devoted itself in a great measure to the defense of Germany, since the Russian long-range bomber units were beginning their attacks on cities in Southern Germany. The SIS was mostly in a position to give timely warning of these attacks. At the end of April the battalion moved to Munkirchen near Passau. As the Western Front drew nearer there followed on May 3rd, the move to Tamplitz (Styria). On the 8th of May at 1300 hours a sudden order was received from Luftflotte 4 to conclude our affairs and proceed immediately westward to Radstadt, without our technical equipment.

* In conclusion it can be said that the SIS in the East was an indispensable instrument to the Command. In addition to a continuous picture of the air and ground situations, the A-2 was given intelligence concerning the building up of strong points, organization, offensive intentions, occupation of airfields, strength of units, transport, lucrative pin-point targets, confirmation of our claims, temper and morale of the enemy troops, and many other details which, in short, yielded a clear picture of the enemy situation. Especially at the time of retreats, of long periods of bad weather, of supply difficulties, and later of shortages of men and equipment, the SIS formed the basis of intelligence for the A-2 and minimized the loss of troops on the Eastern Front. Many letters of commendation from headquarters staffs and operational units to the battalion clearly bore this out. Also my own personal contacts with headquarters and with fighter units revealed to me time and again how necessary the activity of the Signal Intelligence Service had been.

In Russia I observed the land and the people with open eyes. I talked with many Russians and Ukrainians and came to know and appreciate many of them more intimately. The people themselves, especially the farmers, are

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

opposed to Bolshevism.

I have done my duty as a soldier to the Fatherland and have sought no political activity. Therefore I adhered to our policy in the East, at the same time observing our mistakes which seemed incomprehensible to me, and which undoubtedly materially affected the outcome of the war in the East. However, I had been convinced that the war against Bolshevism was necessary. Therefore I have nothing more to say on that score. Later, history will pronounce its judgment.

My personal anxiety at the moment is for my wife who is probably in the region occupied by the Soviet Union. For that reason I am very uncertain as to her fate.

TOP SECRET

Wilhelm Kelch
 Captain, Radio Defense Corps,
 German Army

TOP SECRET

6 July, 1945

Curriculum Vitae

11.10.1915 Born in Uetersen near Hamburg. In 1919 my parents moved to Seppau Krs. Glogau (Silesia). My father conducted a horticultural business.

April 1921 - April 1929 Attended the Protestant elementary school in Schoneau Krs. Glogau.

April 1929 - April 1935 Attended the government Aufbauschule in Steinau a.O. Passed the "Matura" (final state examination)

Oct. 1933 - April 1935 Was member of SA (storm troopers)

April 1935 - Oct. 1935 Labor Service completed

Oct. 1935 - Oct. 1938 In addition to the 2 year duty volunteered for a 3 year service in the Wehrmacht. Belonged at that time to an SIB-Co. (III/N. 16)

April 1938 Promoted to Lieutenant of the Reserve

Dec. 1938 - June 1939 Civilian employee in the cryptographic center of Army Headquarters (specialist for Russia)

June 1939 - Aug. 1939 Conducted a Non-Com. school

Aug. 1939 - Nov. 1939 Took part in the Polish campaign with the third SIB-company of the 18th Signal Regiment

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Nov. 1939 - Aug. 1941 In charge of training courses in close-range signal intelligence at the Army Signal School. Did service as C.O. of 3. Co. of Interpreter Replacement Bn.

Aug. 1941 - Dec. 1941 Platoon leader in an SIS-Co. in Russia

Dec. 1941 - 28.4.1945 C.O. of 1. Co. Radio Monitoring Bn. 1 and at the end of war Bn. C.O.

As of 1 July 1941 promoted to 1st Lieutenant of the Res. and as of 1 July 1944 promoted to Captain of the Reserve.

TOP SECRET

Wilhelm K e l c h
Captain, Radio Defense Corps,
German Army

TOP SECRET

Biography

I was born on October 11, 1915 in Uetersen near Hamburg. My father, who was a market gardener there, lost his fortune in the collapse of 1918. He took over the management of a vegetable garden on an estate in Seppau, Kreis Glogau, Lower Silesia.

From 1929 to April 1935 I went to High School in Steinau on the Oder. I believe I was the only boy in the school who got a full scholarship and all living expenses paid in a schoolboys' boarding establishment. This was for good work in the school and for social work done in an orphan asylum.

The principal of the school was a Social Democrat, Dr. Lucas by name, and he taught us to think politically in a democratic sense, and initiated us into his own independent mental attitude of positive criticism. He tried to bring us up to be enemies of radicalism in politics, whether it was national socialism or bolshevism. In spite of this, I, like 80% at least of the German people, followed the national socialist persuasion, although I did not join the Party. The reasons for my conversion to National Socialism were:

1. I saw that none of the existing parties was in a position to do anything decisive to prevent the growing spiritual and economic disintegration of the German people;
2. I saw, by the conditions under which my parents were living, that not even a Socialist party had up to this time done anything to curb the Junker hierarchy which ruled eastern Germany and lived off its people.
3. I hoped that National Socialism would be successful in creating, as far as possible by peaceful means, a United Europe, analogous to the grand scale political and economic organisms of America, Russia, and Eastern Asia. That is, a Europe where hard and fast boundaries no longer throttled commerce, travel, science, and culture. In the course of the developments after the seizure of power I perceived that National Socialism was waging a successful campaign against the moral degeneration of the masses of the people, but that economic policies created were suitable only to conditions that would probably exist after a successful war resulting in the unification of Europe; for this reason I believed economic policies in the circumstances to be without foundation. With this I lost the hope for the peaceful unification of Europe. This fact alone, however, would not have prevented me from joining the Party and working for it, for the other political "Grossraume" (literally "great areas") of the world were all united by war. What made up my mind was the fact that these developments preparatory to war were being promoted by lead-mouthed and overbearing politicians, whose measures against active opponents

TOP SECRET


TOP SECRET

of the party, and Jews, were to my way of thinking inhuman and a desecration of the high culture of Germany. Added to this was the stupid and intolerant attitude towards the great religious bodies, particularly the Catholic church, and the unhappy example of the private lives of some of the leading men of the Party and the State, who sat like upstarts in positions of legislative responsibility and could not fail to arouse public opinion the world over against the German people as a whole. Indeed they failed no whit. I have always held that some of the internal policies of National Socialism were good ones. But for the reasons stated above I never joined the Party, nor would I, had I as a civilian the chance to do so. When I was 18 I joined the SA, to which I belonged until April 1935, when I entered the Labor Service. In this I held no political post, but was a member of a brass band.

The existence of concentration camps in Germany, about which one heard and read occasionally, did not strike me at the time as something which would injure Germany in the world's opinion. I knew that concentration camps were not invented in Germany, and I knew from other sources as well as German propaganda that since as far back as 1933 Germany was not alone in the possession of such institutions. To me personally they were repugnant to my sense of justice. I knew nothing of what went on inside them, because even released prisoners, when asked about their experiences, would never say a word about them to a German.

During my six months in the Labor Service (Arbeitsdienst) I suffered much under the boorish attitude of the officers, for, abandoned creatures that they were, they had nothing but hatred in their hearts for a man who had made his "Abitur". (equivalent of Freshman year, college).

The Arbeitsdienst taught me the value of physical labor, but being thrown together with all sorts and conditions of men I observed that an exaggerated socialism, which surrounds the lowest social classes with protection in every respect, and absolves them from any and all responsibility for their material security, is basically wrong; because in general, the social position of a man corresponds to his mental, moral, and physical worth.



In October 1935 I was mustered into the 3rd company, Signal Battalion 18, Liegnitz, Silesia, of the Army, one of the first German intercept companies. During my first and second years of service I filled the post of intercept operator, and later as D/P man. By reason of our long coverage assignments, which were especially frequent during periods of international tension, it was possible by means of intercepted messages to follow and clarify the building up of the Czechoslovakian Armed Forces and their troop movements. As experience showed, the exact intelligence furnished by the SIS made it possible for the High Command to put off the security measure of the massing of troops on the Czech frontier, with the exception of one or two intercept companies, until it was really necessary. In my third year of service, in which I was promoted Lieutenant in the Reserve, I served as D/P platoon leader and intelligence platoon leader in the same company. At the end of my third year of enlistment I temporarily quit the service

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

in an active capacity because I was court-martialed and fined as a result of an automobile accident in which I was at fault, and if I had stayed on it would have meant a forfeiture of privileges.

* Thanks to my company commander up to that time, captain von Kornatzky, who had become chief of the Signal Intelligence Headquarters in the High Command of the Army, I got a job in that office as a civilian employee, specialist for Russia. Most of the work of this Signal Intelligence office was unproductive, because it did not perform the most urgently necessary function of exercising a central authority over the whole Army SIS and coordinating it with the Luftwaffe SIS. Instead it made files and notations, became bound up in red tape, and the tactical and operational evaluation of the traffic was held up.

The reasons for this were as follows:

1. The lack of adequate direct land line communications, telephone and particularly teletype, between mobile intercept companies and fixed SI-stations, as well as the absence of a reliable radio link in case the cable was out.
2. The still insufficient practical background of some of the specialists; for an evaluation man in such a central has to know all branches of the intercept business from the ground up by having actually served in an SI-company.
3. Personal incapacity of the chief, now Major von Kornatzky, who however was above reproach as a man.

All positive accomplishments in the building up of the Army signal intelligence from the Signal Intelligence Headquarters are to be credited to the then technical Captain Bodemuller and the very able technical Lieutenant Zipper.

When I saw by the German and foreign press, and news broadcasts, in June 1939 how pronouncedly all developments pointed to war, I tried for a transfer from the SIS Headquarters of the Army and to secure an assignment with an SI-company, as a D/F platoon leader and evaluation officer. (The SIS had been the chief source of information up to the beginning of the war. It gave exact details on the disposition and order of battle of the Polish armed forces. During the campaign the results derived from intercepts were relatively small, for the conditions for operating an SIS during a Blitzkrieg are notably bad.) *

* I met Hitler by chance on the street in Jaroslav towards the end of the Polish campaign, and had occasion to speak to him for a few minutes. His reaction to my report that our signal intelligence was meager was as follows:

* "The disorganization of the Polish armed forces will bring us a quick victory. But this disorganization seems to deprive the SIS of the possibility of drawing conclusions as to the whereabouts of transmitting stations and their interrelationships."

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

* After the conclusion of the campaign I was transferred to the Army Signal School at Halle. I was chief of training for short range signal intelligence in the Signal Instruction Regiment of the Army. Six hundred students were enrolled in the course, which was divided between wire, and radio intelligence.

The wire intelligence men were schooled in the following specialties:

- a) Laying of "Listening lines" (inductive tapping of ground return on single lines and of defective simple circuits);
- b) Laying of "Lauscherden" (Tapping grounds-listening in on single lines by amplification of the ground currents in the listening receiver);
- c) Inductive and capacitive tapping of twisted pairs and cables;
- d) Listening in on permanent lines which were left behind intact, or only partially destroyed in retreats. (Including picking up cross-talk from lines not actually in use by the enemy).

* In order to establish exact data on electrical phenomena under different ground conditions and types of circuits in connection with (b) I had about 2000 practical experiments carried out, and incorporated the results in a memorandum. Later a general inquiry among a large number of men who had done this work in the field, revealed that results from (a) to (c) only could be hoped for, assuming that the wire-tapper encountered no technical difficulties, in a war of position facing an imprudent enemy. I carried out the same general inquiry later as C.O. of the 3rd company of Nachrichten Dolmetscher-Ersatz Abteilung (Signal Interpreter Reserve Battalion).

* Short range radio intelligence in the immediate proximity of the front gave at times outstanding results, depending on the ability and energy of the platoon leader of a short range SI platoon.

* I knew of a case in Brittany where a high-ranking commander of the Waffen SS personally originated a letter of commendation to a platoon leader of a short range SI-platoon of the Army for the superior performance of the platoon. This shows that field commanders, who as in this case look with the basic distrust of a combat or SS-man on all rear echelon soldiers, still can have their minds changed by practical successes.

I had to leave the Army Signal School suddenly, because I had stood up to the C.O. of the Signal Training Regiment in defense of a certain Gefreiter (Corporal) Baumann of Munich, until a brutal injustice done to him, was rectified by Col. General Franck, chief of the Reserve Army.

Thereupon I became chief of the 3rd company of the Signal Interpreter Reserve battalion. In August 1941 I was sent as assistant interpreter and D/P platoon leader to the third company of the 9th Signal Regiment (Intercept Company) which was stationed in the Ukraine. I can give no information on the company's work, as I had too much to do as interpreter to get much of a picture of the technical work.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

In October 1941 I was promoted to 1st Lieutenant of Reserve, as of July 1, 1941 and transferred to the second German Radio Defense unit for the West, which I was to set up, train, and command. The site was Bad Homburg. The unit's mission was to be the monitoring, D/F-ing, and extirpation of clandestine transmitters used by the military, war-industrial and political espionage system of the enemy. I commanded this unit until May 28, 1945. In the last months of the war I commanded the whole battalion, after the former battalion commander West was reported missing and probably dead. My unit, the 1st company/signals monitoring battalion 1 (1. Komp./Funk Ueberwachungs-Abt. 1) had the mission of countering short-wave secret agents in eastern Germany, Belgium, Italy, North Africa, and the South of France, in sequence. Later we did work in the VHF band and operated throughout all Western Europe (France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, and Germany west of the Berlin-Munich line). In 1944, after the first VHF clandestine stations made their appearance in the West, I had to change my outfit over to this work. Mine was the only unit to work on monitoring and countering VHF agents. At first, a Major and a Lieutenant from OKW (supreme Headquarters) tried to achieve some success in this field. When they failed I was given the job. After working out new methods in keeping with enemy technique, I succeeded in 1944 in flushing out an enemy VHF agent in Ghent, Belgium, by purely technical means. Further successes followed in rapid succession. (A detailed analysis of the building up and method of operation of the Radio Defense (Funkabwehr) as well as the collected experiences, follows in a separate report).

Before the invasion I drew up a strong letter to the OKW Army Propaganda Department, in which I criticized sharply the unbearable conditions in the Western European communications zone, which I knew of from years of observation. At the same time I offered suggestions for the improvement of the situation. I maintained in my memorandum, that in the event of an invasion any such communications zone as that would either be run right over or would run away. Lt. Col. Dr. Ellenbeck answered the letter in a friendly way, and mentioned that it had been forwarded to the responsible office in Army Headquarters. At any rate nothing was done about it. The Allied invasion troops had an ally in the German Coa-Z of the West, even if an unwilling one.

Since it was impossible for me towards the end of the war to establish contact with my headquarters in OKW, and since for several reasons radio defense operations in the "Area of National Redoubt" (Festung Alpen) had become senseless, I attached myself to Luftflotte 6 in Klaus, Tirol. From here I and my troops, such as could be reached, were discharged from the German Armed Forces by the German authorities a few days before the war's end.

At present I stand before a void, and my case is typical of soldiers of my age. In the course of the Russian advances I have lost my family, home and all material possessions. I have no wife. I have probably lost contact with my parents and my sister, - in the Thuringian area, into which they fled, has become Russian occupied territory. Shortly before the front extended as far as Thuringen my father, 60 years of age, was called up to arms, against

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

my protest, for the given reason, that evacuated men were to be given "preference" in serving with the Army. Whether he was killed or not I do not know.

I have no profession or calling, as I have served with the Army since 1935 without being a professional soldier. A training in chemistry, which I planned for, is no longer possible because of lack of funds and opportunity. I have known nothing but work since my 13th year. For years on end I have had no vacation. Personal advantages have no importance for me. I volunteered for my present work, because I believe in some small measure it contributes to what I hope for.

I hope for an honest and straightforward collaboration of as many Germans as possible with England and America for the ultimate benefit of all concerned, in order to stave off and avoid that which Oswald Spengler warned of in his well-known book, forbidden by the Nazis: "The Decline of the West".

After my discharge from PW status I would like to be a clerk in some administrative office, unless I am forced to do road repair or some other form of cleaning up.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Erich Hübner
 Captain and Chief of Referat
 Chi-Stelle, Luftwaffe SIS

2 Sept. 1945

Curriculum VitaePersonal Data:

Born: 28 September 1893 in Kruschwitz, Posen
 Father: Ernst Hübner, estate supervisor
 Mother: Ida, nee Tantow
 Married Dora nee Meyer, 24 December 1925
 Has three children

Schooling and Professional Education

1912-1914 Clerk and correspondent, London, England
 1919-1924 Manager of the German Press Service for British and
 American newspapers
 1924-1926 Business manager of the Lactological Institute in Berlin
 1926-1931 Owner of tourist agency in Berlin
 1931-1936 Manager of rural bank, and later on Burgomeister, in
 Wartin, Pomerania
 From 1936 Civil employee in the Air Ministry

Military Career

October 1914 Volunteer, Telegraph Battalion 5, Sperenberg near Berlin;
 training as radio operator
 1915-1918 Evaluator and decipherer at the Army Signal Command 4
 1916 Corporal
 1917 Sergeant
 1918 Technical Sergeant
 1937-1938 Special mission in Spain - Balearic Islands
 Apr. 1940 Tech. Sgt. in the Chi-Stelle
 July 1940 Master Sgt.
 Feb. 1941 1st Lieutenant
 Sept 1944 Captain

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Erich Hübner
Captain and Chief of Referat
Chi-Stelle, Luftwaffe

Biography

I was born on an estate in Posen. As a boy I came to Berlin and attended school until my seventeenth year, when I became a glassblower's apprentice. Two years before the outbreak of World War I, I went to London with the object in view of improving my knowledge of the English language. Upon the outbreak of war I returned to Germany. My desire to become a soldier was not fulfilled immediately, but I was assigned by the military authorities to the firm of Telefunken in Berlin to learn radio operating. After two months training I was enrolled, in December 1914, as a radio operator in Telegraph Battalion 5.

In this unit I received my basic military training. When this training was completed, I was assigned as a radio operator and motor vehicle driver to the fixed radio station at the Hq., Army Command 4 in Belgium. Chief of this station was the then Captain Guderian, who later, in World War II, became the outstanding tank specialist, and last Chief of the General Staff of the German Army. In the first weeks of my duty, I had to intercept and translate the British and French Army daily reports as transmitted by their headquarters.

It was during this time that the Germans first undertook the interception of enemy radio traffic in the West. As at that time there was no significant Army radio traffic, we began interception of British Navy traffic. The messages intercepted we found to be cryptographed in a three or five-letter code. Both systems could be broken and solved within a short time.

The decoded messages were sent to the German Navy Headquarters. At the end of 1915 the Navy established its own SIS, the personnel of which worked with us at first. After the battle of the Skagerrak in 1916, the Navy SIS took over the monitoring of British Navy frequencies, and the Army SIS switched over to British Army traffic, the existence of which had been learned by search intercept.

This British Army traffic originated with front-line (trench) stations of corps and divisions, half of which was tactical, the remainder of a training nature. The messages were cryptographed in a five-letter code, which was immediately broken. The decoded messages were sent by the "Hughes" machine, a primitive sort of teletype, to Army Headquarters and the Headquarters of the Supreme Command. Our own SIS intercept station was located in Thielt, Belgium. In succeeding days even all Army Corps were furnished SIS intercept stations, which sent their intercepted messages to our station, which thus became a central station for the SIS in the West. I myself specialized in the breaking of the daily - changing key - words upon which the system of the five-letter cipher was based. This

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

system was called "Playfair" by the British, and was used in World War II by the Norwegians. The breaking of the messages, depended on the finding of the keyword, which required time proportionate to the number of messages on hand for study. But in order to break as many messages as possible I had to begin search for the keyword promptly. During the course of the war, three additional British Armies, and a French Cavalry Corps under British command, all of them using a different keyword, appeared on our front. So five different keywords had to be found daily. This accomplished, the keywords were transmitted to the various SIS outstations so that the decoding of messages as they were intercepted could begin.

The decoded messages contained lists of losses, strength of reserves, materiel requirements, etc., so that the building up of strong points and large-scale offensive preparations, could be deduced. By this means we were spared patrols with consequent loss of bloodshed. Naturally the thoroughness of SIS techniques in those days is not to be compared with the scientific acuteness and systematic comprehensiveness of those that characterized SIS operations in World War II. Nevertheless, the SIS enjoyed high repute even in those early days, which is demonstrated by the fact that I a mere sergeant, could approach the G-3 of the General Staff of the Fourth Army any time, day or night, whenever an especially important message came to hand.

After the war I became private secretary to one of my former comrades with whom I had collaborated in deciphering work, and who had become in the meanwhile the owner of the German Press Bureau. As our special tasks, we assigned ourselves the observation of the German workers' movement, and the battle against Bolshevik influences in their unions.

At the end of 1924 I became business manager of the Lactological Institute in Berlin in which my chief of the German Press Bureau was financially interested. As this Dr. Levinsohn, who was a Jew, had a sense of the coming evolution in Germany, and began to liquidate his business interests, I was threatened with unemployment at a time when Germany was deep in economic crisis, and unemployment was becoming an outstanding feature of her social life. So I was compelled, under most unfavorable circumstances, to seek a new job. As I found nothing immediately, I tried my hand at establishing a tourists' service with my private automobile. This business flourished to such an extent that by the year 1931, I had seven automobiles so employed. Among other connections, I had an agreement with the American Express Company, for which I conducted tours throughout all parts of Germany, and even in other European countries. As the economy of Germany came to a stand still in the early nineteen thirties, I had to dispose of one car after another, so that again I faced the prospect of unemployment.

I had in the meanwhile acquired a family, and had the responsibility of a wife and two children. At the end of 1931 my father

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

died. He had been manager of a rural bank. The community now offered me the post left vacant by the death of my father. I grasped the opportunity without a moment's hesitation. About the same time I became manager of a livestock by-products company of the county. In order to obtain this additional position, I, of course, had to enter the Party. All of the province of Pomerania, in which the county and village of my activities were located, was a hot-bed of National Socialism. But I was reasonably content for I was busily engaged upon earning a modest but secure livelihood.

In the year 1935 I attended an evening meeting in Berlin of the veterans of my old military organization, Telegraph Battalion 5. There I met my former company commander, who was the brother of the man who was Chief Signal Officer of the recently established Luftwaffe, Colonel, later General, Martini. He proposed that I visit his brother, Colonel Martini, who was eagerly searching for people with SIS experience. The following day I called on the Colonel. The result was my employment by the Air Ministry beginning as of March, 1936.

At first I was sent, in order to refresh my knowledge, to the fixed SIS station of the Army, located near Stuttgart. Here I spent six months, whereupon I was transferred to Munster in Westphalia where I headed the evaluation section. The special duty of the Luftwaffe SIS station in Munster was the monitoring of British traffic. The radio traffic of the RAF limited itself mainly to routine flight reports. As the messages were transmitted in the clear, our work was very simple, and we were able to present at all times a very precise picture of the RAF. The monitoring was limited at first to point-to-point traffic. Only after a year was attention given to the monitoring of air-to-ground traffic.

In March, 1937, I was transferred from Munster to Potsdam-Eiche, where a fixed SIS station, intended for the monitoring of Russian traffic, had to be established. My particular duty was to set up the evaluation section. With the actual traffic of the Soviet Union I had not to concern myself; for that there were specialists who knew the language.

After completion of my duty in Potsdam-Eiche, I was called, in the middle of 1937, into the Air Ministry, where I laid the foundation of Referat B of the Chi-Stelle. The Chi-Stelle as a whole had just been established, and comprised a staff of one officer, one inspector and 10-12 civil employees. It embraced at first four sections: Great Britain - France - Belgium;
Italy;
Russia - Poland - Czechoslovakia;
Deciphering.

The work was so arranged that the messages intercepted by the three fixed Luftwaffe SIS stations existing in 1937 (Munich, Munster and Potsdam-Eiche), were reviewed once more, and assembled for the use of the A-2 of the Luftwaffe General Staff.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

This first tour of duty in the Air Ministry lasted for only three months. At this time working procedure in Referat B concerning Great Britain was as follows: the fixed SIS station in Munster sent its intercepted messages of the RAF to the Chi-Stelle. Here they were rearranged according to their importance, and, stripped of frequencies, call-signs, and other mere technical data, were sent as purely tactical reports to the General Staff. This procedure seemed rather poor to me; therefore I began to study the routine flight reports of the RAF to enrich our evaluation. In the midst of this undertaking I was suddenly transferred to Spain.

At this time the Spanish Civil War had reached a crisis. To check the shipping lanes between Gibraltar and Tunisia, parts of two British hydroplane reconnaissance squadrons were transferred from Great Britain to Arzew. Moreover the French started extensive military maneuvers in North Africa to which was transferred much of the French Air Force from the European Continent. To monitor these maneuvers ten intercept operators were sent to Mallorca, and I was added to the party as an evaluator. We learned that the British reconnaissance aircraft maintained a constant patrol in the Western Mediterranean. Meanwhile the French Air Force made cross-country flights in rather large formations. The gist of the intelligence extracted for the German General Staff from this information was that the French Air Force was well fitted for operations, because the number of aircraft returning early from missions was very small.

The withdrawal of the British reconnaissance in January 1938 to Great Britain, terminated our own sojourn in the Balearic Islands, which had been very agreeable after all. I returned to the Air Ministry where I dedicated myself to the establishment of Referat B of the Chi-Stelle. In the beginning I had to battle for the organization of the single Referat of the Chi-Stelle on an analogous basis to that of the A-2 section of the Luftwaffe General Staff. Eventually there was re-established or organized:

- Referat A: Personnel and Radio Equipment of other Countries.
- Referat B: England, Belgium and Holland.
- Referat C: France and Italy.
- Referat D: Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Balkan States.
- Referat E: Cryptanalysis.

These organizations remained intact, except for slight changes, until the end of the war.

I was unable to hinder the establishment of a Referat F, in which was created a central section for the analysis of the radio traffic of all European countries. It was an absurd undertaking which eliminated itself in October 1940 after the transfer of Referat B to France.

I myself worked again in Referat B and resumed the study of

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

RAF flight reports, which study had been interrupted by my tour of duty in Spain. The organization of the RAF was adequately known to us from the publication, "Air Force List", which was revised and published once a month, and could be purchased in every large book shop in London. Strength and equipment, as well as certain details of the organization, were military secrets, which of course were not published.

Of the 100-200 daily messages of the RAF, flight reports constituted the bulk. These flight reports took the following form:
K 7954 Battle with PO. E. C. Maxwell left Bircham Newton
0900 sta Turneridge 1030 - 0910

The register of the aircraft number (K7954) and a looking up of the pilot's name (PO E.C. Maxwell) in the Air Force List, gave the number and type of the aircraft, and the squadron to which it belonged. Thus I could determine what types of aircraft, by name and number the RAF had. Besides, it was soon evident that if one aircraft had the number k-7801, and another of the same type was numbered K-8050, all numbers between them represented aircraft of the same type. In a Blenheim series, we could track exactly what aircraft by number, and the quantity, were brought from a certain factory, and whether they were used in Great Britain or the Colonies. Finally, with the help of these lists, the strength and types of aircraft at every station could be identified. So I was always able to give the exact number of all British bombers, fighters, reconnaissance, training and carrier aircraft in the RAF.

In this connection, an incident occurring in the Spring of 1939 deserves mention. Between an airfield and a training center I observed that aircraft were suddenly exchanged, though the crews were not. Reporting this fact to the A-2, who was always skeptical of my reports, holding me strictly to account for them, I noticed his surprise at the information I gave him. It was then I learned that two German A-2 officers were scheduled to visit the airfield the day after the transfer of the aircraft took place, their object being to see the latest type of British combat aircraft. Obviously the British thought better of this, and removed them before the arrival of our A-2 officers. It was then that the A-2 insisted that I accompany the next official party scheduled for a visit to the RAF. Moreover, General Martini, Chief of the Luftwaffe Signal Service, commended me for my work. Unfortunately, further visits to the RAF did not take place because war broke out in the meanwhile.

Immediately after the outbreak of the war we moved from Berlin to the old riding school of Frederick the Great (The Marstall) in Potsdam.

The outbreak of the war brought no changes in our general situation except that we were restricted to the confines of the Marstall.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

The only change in our work was that the transmission of messages in clear text ceased; consequently we concentrated on traffic evaluation. We could now follow the energetic expansion of the RAF in the appearance of a host of additional call-signs in the preamble of messages.

Almost in the first days of the war there fell into our hands Syko cards for the period of one month, which were retrieved from a British aircraft which had been shot down. Thanks to these cards, all intercepted Syko messages could be immediately broken by Referat B; and thus the link with our peacetime operations was established. They gave us confirmation of the conjectures made upon the basis of our traffic analysis. Besides the Syko cards, both three-letter and three-figure codes were used by the RAF for short messages. Captured RAF and Naval codes presented us with the means of reading even those messages which contained precious details on reconnaissance aircraft. Lastly, the encoded grid-positions, which the ground stations transmitted to their reconnaissance aircraft over Germany, could be immediately decoded and evaluated.

Thus the necessity of an immediate evaluation was demonstrated. At first I performed this work in addition to my other duties. Later on, after my transfer to Paris, there was established a special subsection of Referat B for this purpose.

Immediately after the outbreak of the war, the W-Leitstellen were established. The W-Leit were SIS evaluation companies stationed at headquarters of the Luftflotten, whose task it was to evaluate all material intercepted by the SIS units within the area of the Luftflotten. This work was done essentially for the A-2's of the Luftflotten. The W-Leit which worked for Referat B was W-Leit 2 in Münster. The outstations of the W-Leit sent all the material they intercepted and evaluated both to the W-Leit 2 and to Referat B, so that a two-fold evaluation took place. During the course of the Battle of France, W-Leit 2 moved to Brussels, while its outstations and SIS companies settled down on the Channel Coast. Shortly after the capitulation of France, W-Leit 3, which had monitored France, began to intercept RAF traffic also. Sometime before, W-Leit 5 in Oslo had been established, which directed its efforts toward Britain also. So it happened that three W-Leitstellen worked for Referat B.

During this time the intercept of the R/T of the RAF Fighter Command began. As R/T, in nature, is of immediate tactical value, the Referat had to leave the handling of this material largely to the outstations. Great repute was won by the SIS at this time by the operations of a certain R/T platoon stationed on the Channel Coast, which in close co-operation with the combat aviation of the Luftwaffe, was able to present, from intercepted R/T traffic, a detailed picture of the air situation over Great Britain. It was

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

at this time that the entire Luftwaffe was concentrated upon the assault on Great Britain. The RAF had rapidly dwindled in strength until little but fighter aircraft remained. Consequently, the principal task of the SIS was concentration upon the interception of the traffic of these RAF fighters. The Referat could do little in these decisive months for the reason that the material did not reach them, since its nature was entirely tactical and information it contained was transmitted direct to the interested headquarters by the outstations. A further reason for the comparative weakness of the Referat at this ^{time} was the lack of experienced personnel familiar with R/T interception. The R/T sub-section was promptly enlarged, it is true; but the young soldiers transferred to the Marstall from other units of the Luftwaffe, needed to serve a certain apprenticeship in order to acquire experience. Nevertheless the Referat succeeded in following the 13 and 14 Fighter Groups of the RAF, a work which had a certain value in view of the regular raids of the Luftwaffe against Scotland and Scapa Flow. The real heart of the SIS in these days was the already mentioned R/T station at Wissant. In its evaluation section, the strength of the remaining RAF fighters was determined, and reported to Field Marshal Kesselring, who called in personally every day for this information.

* A further merit of the Referat should be mentioned. There the first investigations were made of British radars and IFF, clues to which were furnished by the intercepted R/T messages. Even though the specialists of the Referat lacked technical qualifications, yet they were able to read out of the intercepted R/T messages how these radar and IFF sets were employed, and so were able to furnish important hints to the technicians who were making a special study of these devices. The R/T sub-section was always one of the most lively and intelligent of the Referat.

With the appearance of fighter R/T, the Referat, which in the Spring of 1940 comprised about ten specialists, was divided into five sub-sections as follows:

- Immediate Evaluation;
- Bomber Evaluation;
- Coastal Command Evaluation;
- Fighter Evaluation;
- D/F and captured documents evaluation.

This organization remained in existence for a rather long time. Moreover the Referat was one of the few offices authorized to listen to the broadcasts of the BBC. The daily news broadcasts of the BBC were intercepted, evaluated and translated, and so furnished to the Luftwaffe General Staff.

In the mid-summer of 1940, the personnel of the Referat was more than doubled by transfer to it of soldier linguists from other units of the Luftwaffe. At the same time, I, as the senior employee of the Referat, was inducted into the military service with the grade of Master Sergeant. It was required that the Chief of the Referat be

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

a commissioned officer. So I became deputy chief, and as such it was my duty to assign work to the specialists, while I continued to head the evaluation section. In order to supply the A-2 with a complete picture of the current air situation, I introduced, against the opposition of W-Leit 2, a daily SIS report. The material therefore had to reach me by a certain fixed hour from the SIS outstations, and the two evaluation companies of W-Leit 2 and W-Leit 5, respectively. As in those days a rather considerable number of decoded messages were available to the Referat, they were translated and distributed as daily translations of decoded messages. Finally, after raids of British bombers, maps were prepared for the General Staff, which showed the fixes of the bombers as transmitted to them by their ground stations. There did not yet exist any monthly SIS reports, but special reports covering particular problems in which A-2 was interested were prepared.

In September, 1940, the Headquarters of the Luftwaffe General Staff was transferred to France, and with it the operational portion of A-2. Also the battalion staff of the Chi-Stelle, as well as Referat B, followed. There remained in the Marstall, Referate A, C and D, as well as some decipherers. We of Referat B occupied, together with our battalion staff, some villas in Amieres near Paris. The effect upon the work was gratifying because we now had more direct contact with the outstations. In this time W-Leit 3 began the monitoring of British traffic. To avoid duplication of effort a division in the work was made. W-Leit 3 was assigned the task of monitoring southeast England, which corresponded to the task of its Luftflotte. W-Leit 2 concentrated upon west and southwest England. Meanwhile the monitoring of Scotland was assigned to W-Leit 5. The Referat, as the final evaluation agency, stood above these evaluation companies (W-Leit), and still had direct contact with the outstations and SIS companies.

During this time the German Command hatched great plans. Though I held but a modest position, I sat in the midst of all this planning, and there were no preparations of which I did not have knowledge. In December of 1940, suddenly the plan to knock out England by direct assault was abandoned, even though the RAF was practically annihilated, and the Luftwaffe Headquarters returned to Berlin. Even the staff of the Chi-Stelle battalion was separated from Referat B, the latter remaining in France, and returned to the Marstall. In February of 1941, Luftflotte 2 was withdrawn from the Western Front. This made necessary an extensive re-organization of our order of battle in the West. W-Leit 2, which withdrew with its Luftflotte, left some of its SIS units on the Channel Coast. These were taken over by W-Leit 3, which henceforth had to monitor all of southern England. Moreover W-Leit 3 sent some of its units, which had been stationed in Paris, to reinforce those units of W-Leit 2 which remained on the Channel Coast. Referat B tried to equalize all these changes. This was necessary because the evaluation company of W-Leit 3 tended to favor its own units. During all these changes the Chief of the Referat was transferred, whereupon I, as his former deputy, was promoted to the grade of first lieutenant.

TOP SECRET

In April 1941, I was ordered to re-train operators of the fixed SIS station at Premstatten near Graz, from Eastern traffic to RAF traffic. Our Balkan armies had just occupied Athens. The SIS station at Premstatten was transferred there after the Balkan campaign, and formed the nucleus for the later SIS battalion in the southeast, which in subsequent years under the command of Major Feichtner, gained great renown and prestige.

After my return to Amnieres I became Chief of the Referat, and remained in this position until the summer of 1942. About this time came the switching over from the offensive to the defensive, and the SIS had to concentrate upon the development of a closer-knit organization. Reports by intercept companies were forbidden, and the evaluation was concentrated in the Leitstellen. To eliminate duplication of effort, even in the companies, it was my recommendation that each section be assigned a definite, clear-cut mission. Referat B gained much in prestige and its decisions were finally recognized as authoritative. The work within the Referat became fully organized and specialized by section. Co-operation with W-Leit 3, that in the beginning showed much friction, now functioned smoothly. Contact with the Dulag Luft (PW enclosure) at Oberursel was established at this time. In the matter of collaboration between the SIS of the Army, Navy and Luftwaffe, The Chi-Stelle always led the way. Its tactical evaluation was done almost exclusively for the Navy, to which the decoded messages of the British Coastal Command were communicated by wire means. Liaison officers were exchanged with the Army SIS located in St. Germain. Even with the technical officers of the Luftwaffe there was constant contact.

The most astounding successes were reached by the sub-section of the Referat which dealt with captured documents and navigational aids. Though I witnessed only its beginning, even in those early days, there was met with equal inventiveness and perspicacity the technical developments of the enemy. Under my direction there was initiated a series of reports on navigational aids, which were of the best ever produced in the SIS.

In the summer of 1941, two semi-annual reports on the RAF Fighter Command following the Battle of Britain were prepared. In these reports the General Staff was first apprised of the new tactics of the British fighters, especially the night fighters. Both these reports aroused considerable interest, and the German fighter arm, particularly, was most grateful for them.

Already at the beginning of the war Referat B had a specialist for British overseas traffic. This traffic was monitored by the SIS station in Oberhaching in Bavaria. In the Spring of 1941, after conquest of the Balkans, the Luftwaffe began intensified operations

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

in the Mediterranean. It was then demonstrated that strong SIS reinforcements were needed in this area. So my three specialists on British overseas traffic were returned to the Marstall as the nucleus of a new Referat, which replaced the old Referat devoted to France. When I transferred these three men I had no idea what significance this Referat would assume for me after a year.

The first experiments in the study of American traffic date back to the summer of 1941. American traffic was intercepted on the great rhombic antenna system at Bernau, near Berlin. Our own intercept station near Amnieres endeavored to intercept this traffic, and did succeed in picking up many ground stations. In the late summer of 1941, I received orders to establish an American evaluation section analogous to existing ones. At the same time a large SIS platoon, situated near the Referat, began systematic study of American frequencies. Since the Americans were not yet involved with the Axis powers and their transmissions were largely in clear text, we succeeded after a few months, despite the great distances involved and our lack of detailed knowledge of the Americans, to obtain quite a clear picture of American air armament.

In the first half of 1942, outlines of new developments became visible. The expansion of the Army Co-operation Command of the RAF made necessary a new section of the Referat. Also the section covering American traffic was increased for the intensive monitoring of the Ferry Command. Parallel to these growing tasks in the Referat, came an expansion of personnel in the out-stations and battalions, so that the activation of an SIS Regiment for the West became urgent. The aim in establishing an SIS Regiment was to release the SIS from the supervision of the commanders of the signal regiments of the Luftflotten, and to give the SIS identity as a separate organization.

In retrospect I must admit that this period was one of the most agreeable of the entire war. We had become acquainted and made friends in a charming country and our work was a joy to us, to me the more so since I had finally gathered together in the Referat a team of collaborators, concerning which I had every reason to feel proud. The general military situation still seemed hopeful, and promised us an attractive future. With the French population we lived on good terms. After accustoming themselves to the occupation, civilians and soldiers found many congenial contacts with each other. I was therefore rather dejected, when, in the summer of 1942, while on leave which I spent with my family in Potsdam, I was told by Major Friederich that I was to be immediately transferred to the Marstall, where I was to take over Referat C.

The reorganization of Referat C was indeed most urgently needed. The Mediterranean was then in addition to Russia, the principal theatre of war, and the A-2 who asked for daily reports on the air situation there was most disappointed in the slight intelligence we received. This was not to be wondered at since very little had been done by my

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

predecessor in Referat C to bring the evaluation work up to requirements. Though the specialists of the Referat were almost all men of culture and experience, they had but recently joined the Marstall, without any particular preparation for their work. Therefore, though possessed of the best will, they did not know how to handle the material they were called upon to analyze and evaluate. My first task was to point out the objectives of the work; my second, the creation of a traffic evaluation section, since I realized clearly that the future of the Referat lay not in air-to-ground traffic alone, but mainly in the point-to-point traffic of the Allied Air Forces in the Mediterranean theatre. In this respect Major Feichtner proved a pioneer, and, with his battalion in Athens, had paved the way for me, and had anticipated my intentions. The excellent material he gathered proved a great help. Co-operation with him, who was for a short time my chief in Asnières, was especially close and fruitful of results.

At first I divided the personnel of the Referat roughly into three large groups. In the first group I gathered all specialists whose special task it was to study air-to-ground traffic. The second group comprised, under supervision of an experienced traffic evaluator that I had brought in from an out-station, all men that worked on point-to-point traffic. The third group was formed of those who worked on supply traffic. Before composing the daily situation report I held a conference at which every specialist summarized his material, following which comparisons were made. Thus co-ordination alone was not all that this procedure assured; the specialists also learned the salient points in all the material, and how to extract them. As they were willing and studious, I very shortly created here also a crew of reliable collaborators.

In due time all these changes were reflected in positive improvement in results. As the Referat became more familiar with its tasks, so the battalions in the South became more aware of its functions. Moreover, the Referat now could finally make sound decisions on questions of operations and evaluation, which in turn were reflected in an improvement in the work of the battalions. Nowhere ^{was} the true functions of the Chi-Stelle so visible as in the operations of this Referat. Not the least of its significant services was that it served as a co-ordinative link between the western battalion of the South, located in Taormina, Sicily, and the eastern battalion in Athens, which otherwise, because of the comparatively weak lateral communication, would have tended to lose essential contact. Then, too, since the material gathered by the respective battalions differed to a considerable degree in its basic nature, the need of the Referat as a co-ordinating evaluation agency was all the more essential. Thus, I believe that much good was accomplished by my labors in Referat C.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

This fact was also generously acknowledged by the A-2 section of the Luftwaffe General Staff, with which, since the earliest days of 1943, the utmost of co-operation had existed with respect to co-ordinating the material gathered by each organization. It was especially true with respect to Figure 2 of the monthly report prepared by the Referat. This Figure 2 graphically depicted the existing organization, down to flights, of the Allied Air Forces in the Mediterranean and Near East theatres, and was accepted without changes for incorporation in the monthly report of the A-2 section.

The high esteem in which Referat C was held by the A-2 found expression also in the fact that when particularly difficult and delicate problems were under discussion in the General Staff, I was invited to participate.

In February of 1943, the first women auxiliaries were employed in the Referat. This was brought about not alone by the increase of work, but also by reason of orders that all able-bodied men possible must be made available for service at the front, being replaced by women. In order to make contact with the battalions of the South, more immediate and personal exchanges of specialists between them and the Referat became customary. By these means we were able to keep pace with the rapid developments that marked the ensuing years. As the air raids on Berlin became more frequent and intense, the Referat put R/T operators on the monitoring of Allied bombers and their fighter escort. These R/T operators were normally evaluators, who took up their monitoring duties only during air raids, while the remaining personnel found shelter.

To Referat C were added three further sections, as time went on:

- a. Free French section
- b. Turkish section
- c. Swedish section

Six specialists worked upon this traffic, and prepared weekly and monthly reports on these air forces. The material was supplied by SIS intercept platoons located on the borders of these countries. These reports served to inform the General Staff concerning the evolution of the air forces, and the extent of their co-operation with the Allies.

In March 1945, Referat C was absorbed by the evaluation section of SIS Regiment 352 (South). I became liaison officer between this regiment and the Marstall. The Russian advance forced us to retire to Oberhaching near the city of Munich, and, finally the intrusion of the Americans in that area, compelled our further retirement to the Tyrol. Here an attack of an old illness returned, and I was discharged from the Luftwaffe on 30 April 1945, a few days before the capitulation.

TOP SECRET

20 June, 1945

I. Personal Data

2 June 1913

Born in Odessa/Ukraine. Father: Viktor Werther from Idbau/Lithuania, occupation: director of a business establishment. Mother: Helene, daughter of the goldmine proprietor Kositzki-Korsuchin from Irkutsk/Siberia.

15 June 1939

Married to nurse Hedwig Rappe from Korbach/Waldeck. Two children.

II. Schooling and professional education

1920 - 1925

Treitschke school in Berlin-Wilmersdorf.

1925 - 1931

Gymnasium of German Natural Sciences in Riga/Latvia.

June 1931

"Matura" (final state examination) in Riga.

1931 - 1936

Study often interrupted and not completed at the Berlin University (National Economy; History, History of Art, Sociology and Journalism). Was a working student (Werkstudent).

III. Occupational- and Military Career

Jan. 1934 - March 1935

Voluntary Labor Service in Bad Homburg v.d.H.

1. Jan. 1937

Employed by RLM as decipherer.

Jan. - March 1937

Civilian training in radio operating at the Air Signal Bn. in Bernau near Berlin.

March - July 1937

Military basic training as radio operator at Air Signal Replacement Co., Berlin-Kladow.

7 June 1937

Pfc. of the Res. and Res. officer candidate.

Jan. - June 1939

In charge of deciphering at SI-station in Budapest (W.z.b.V.).

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

July 1939 - Aug. 1942	Vice Referatsleiter B1 (deciphering East) at Chi-Stelle Ob.d.L.
1. Aug. 1940	Sgt. of the Res.
1. Jan. 1941	S/Sgt. of the Res.
1 April 1941	Lieutenant (Kr.O.) (war time officer).
Aug. 1942 - July 1943	In charge of deciphering at Luftflotte 6 (Northern Sector). Duty Intelligence officer at 14./Air Signal Rgt. 1 (later 1./Air Signal Reg. 353).
July 1943	In charge of deciphering at Luftflotte 6 (central sector).
July 1943 - May 1944	Duty Intelligence officer 10./Air Signal Regt. 35 (later 7./Air Signal Regt. 353).
March - April 1944	Co. C.O. training course in Nancy.
May 1944	Co. C.O. and
15 July 1944	Co. C.O. at 7./Air Signal Regt. 353.
Decorations	Sudeten Medal, Kriegsverdienstkreuz 2. Class m. Schw. (3.12.1940) and Kriegsverdienstkreuz 1. Class m. Schw. (16.12.1941).

TOP SECRET

Curriculum Vitae

I was born on 2 June 1913 in Odessa)Ukraine. My father Viktor Werther was born in Kurland of German descent and was for many years a merchant in Russia and the Far East. He held the post of a director of the Russian-American Rubber Co. "Treugolnik". My mother Helene was the daughter of the Russian goldmine proprietor, Leonard Kositzky-Korsuchin from Irkutsk/Siberia.

In 1919 my father decided, to leave Russia, because, being an educated and well-to-do man, he became a "class enemy" in the eyes of the Bolsheviki, even though he was never interested or active in politics. My family, consisting of my parents, my sister Lydia, and I, left Odessa on the French troop transport-ship "Afon". Later we met only a few of our numerous relatives and friends, as most of them fell victims of the Russian revolution.

After nearly a year of travelling through Turkey, Greece and Italy we settled down in Switzerland, where my father had saved part of his fortune. After a short time we left Switzerland for Germany, because, unfortunately, my father had confidence in the stability of the German Mark. Here we lost during the inflation the fortune my father had saved while in Russia.

I attended German schools in Berlin until 1925 and was told time and again, to remember and improve my knowledge of the Russian language. After 1925 we moved to Riga in Latvia, my father's old home town, where he took over the agency of the German Commercial Information Bureau (the former Dun & Co) for the Baltic States. In Riga I became a member of the national Boy Scout organization of Latvia and later on, after the resignation of the minority groups from this organization caused by the radical chauvinistic attitude shown by the Latvians, I became leader of the German Boy Scouts in this country.

In the summer of 1931 I passed the examination which entitled me to University study, (Reifeprüfung) in a German school. I took up "Political Sciences" at the Berlin University. Riga had a well-known University, but I would not have had much of a chance to pass the preliminary entrance examinations, as the percentage of students of the minority groups (Germans, Russians, Jews), admitted for study, was purposely kept low. Originally I had the intention to become a journalist and for this reason I tried to acquire as much all-around knowledge as possible and to enlarge my horizon by travelling in foreign countries (France, Switzerland, Austria, Lithuania, Estonia, Finland).

In 1932 it was necessary to finance my studies myself. I refused a scholarship offered to me by the VDA (Verein fuer das Deutschtum in Ausland, i.e., organization of Germans in foreign countries), in order to keep my independence. The VDA asked that students, having accepted such scholarships return to their home country after completion of their studies, but as a foreigner in Latvia my chances to get ahead in a job would not have been satisfactory.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

I became a so-called working student (Werkstudent) earning the money for my studies by free journalistic occupation, especially on the subject of political economy, and also by holding positions as private secretary to a Berlin professor of history and as a scientific assistant for expositions and of the German Broadcasting Corp.

In Berlin I was a member of a student organization (Deutsch-Akademische Gildenschaft), which comprised students of the "Baendische" youth (boy scouts etc.). After the National-Socialists came into power, our guild decided, to show their loyalty towards the new government and ruled that its members would enter the SA (storm troopers). I belonged to the SA until my entry in the Voluntary Labor Service. My student guild dissolved in 1936, but personal contact between the old comrades remained.

I refused the offer of the career of an overseer in the Labor Service, because I wanted to continue my studies even at the risk of not being able to finish them. At first, I had many financial worries but later as a working student I enjoyed a good income. Ultimately I found I had neither the time nor the will to conclude my studies by formal examination. My plans to become a journalist were dropped as the commencing bureaucracy of this profession did not appeal to me.

On 1 January 1937 the "Reichsluftfahrtministerium" employed me because of my knowledge of foreign languages and countries. Although I was not told what my job would be, for reasons of secrecy, I found a job there as cryptanalyst (Entzifferer), which captivated me and made me more and more enthusiastic over my work.

After a two month (civilian) course in W/T at the Signal Battalion in Bernau near Berlin, I reported for a four month military course as a W/T specialist at the "Ln. Ergaenzungskompanie" in Berlin-Kladow, upon completion of this course I was promoted to Pfc. of the Reserve (Gefreiten d. Res.) and nominated as OCS candidate of the reserve (Reserveoffiziersanwaerter).

After that (July 1937) I was transferred to the "Chi-Stelle Ob.d.L." and worked there for several weeks as an assistant to the crypt-specialist for Czechoslovakia. Later I worked on Russian traffic and was able to make some valuable contributions. In 1938 I solved the code of the Latvian air force without help and without knowledge of the language; because of this I was introduced to General Martini and awarded a sum of money.

In addition to my current work I had to look after the schooling and progress of my colleagues and after successfully handling crypt-analysis at the fixed SI-stations in the East, I reported for an intended SI-campaign in East Asia. However, the project was dropped before any progress had been made.

In the autumn of 1938 I took part in the "Zeppelin" campaign against Czechoslovakia, but Russian VHF-stations in Czechoslovakia were non-existent. In January 1939 my first independent assignment, of professional skill and organization, was given me; I was in charge of crypt-analysis at the "W.s.b.V." in Budapest. I then had the opportunity to become acquainted

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

with the Hungarian SIS. The Hungarians showed a very reserved attitude and were not very cooperative. In addition to the real task of the "W.z.b.V.", mainly the observation of Russia, I also assisted the Hungarians in their work on Rumarda.

After my return from Hungary in June 1939 I was married and made my home in Berlin. In November 1943 our house was completely ruined by a British air attack. My family now live with my in-laws near Kassel and since January of this year I have had no news from my wife and two children.

When the war started I was acting as vice Deputy Chief of Referat (Referatsleiter) E I (Entzifferung Ost, i.e., crypt-analysis East) (civilian) of the Chi-Stelle Ob.d.L. Soon, after however, I was ordered to report to the same station as a (Pfc.) Gefreiter, whereby my job did not change, but was rendered more difficult by my low grade. In the summer of 1940 I became a Sergeant, on the 1 January 1941 a Staff Sergeant and after three more months a Second Lieutenant, without having to attend the War College as was the usual case.

Efforts were made to build up a crypt-analysis organization for Poland only a short time before hostilities actually started. This work was relatively unsuccessful as the campaign was short; however, the Soviet material was observed more and more intensively and the occupation of Eastern Poland by the Soviets could be followed currently as all transmissions were being read by that time. The results of this work were put before the Fuehrungsstab (Operations Staff) in the form of a large dossier. The Russ.-Fin. war was also observed continuously and the Soviet transmissions could be read nearly 100%. The problem of the 5 figure-Warna-traffic was completely solved at that time. From a captured Soviet textbook regarding the codes and ciphers in Finland and according to later testimonies of PW's, the Bolsheviks recognized some of their mistakes and avoided them later, to our sorrow; but they underestimated greatly the possibilities of enemy crypt-analysis.

The change of the Soviet codes gave us many problems in 1940 and constant effort was necessary to fulfill the expectations of our high command at the beginning of the battles in the East. During the first months of the battles in the East, the results of crypt-analysis were exceedingly important.

In December 1941 I was decorated with one of the first 5 Kriegsverdienstkreuze I. Klasse (War Service Cross), which were given out in the SIS.

I stayed with Chi-Stelle East until August 1942 till it reached Zhitomir and was then ordered to take over the crypt work at Luftflotte 1 in the northern sector (14. Kamp. Ln. Rgt. 1, Riga). We were able to get very interesting results, in this sector, even though the Soviets maintained excellent discipline and security. In 1943 I had the chance to study the Finnish SIS rather closely, and to exchange valuable technical experiences, during an official period of Duty with the Finnish General Staff.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

In July 1943 I took over the crypt Department in the central sector (10. Kamp./Ln.Rgt. 35, later 7. Kamp./Ln.Rgt. 353) and after completing a course for company commanders, I took over the whole evaluation company in this sector without giving up the technical job of chief of crypt-analysis. I continued in this capacity until the surrender of the German Wehrmacht.

Note:

After I entered the RIA., I became a member of the NSDAP (1938) by wish of my employer, although it was never possible for me to work actively in the Party.

TOP SECRET